On Adjusting to Change: LTGEN YANO (CGPA) to Conference Group Alfa on 05 Nov 2007, “Radio Messages must not be all in capitalized letters. It should conform to ordinary letter-document format because we are sending them by fax or email, no longer by Morse codes!”

The Combat Support for an Intensified Internal Security Operations (ISO)

The AFP has a standing order from the President to finish the insurgency problem by 2010. The Capability Upgrade Program (CUP) for the Philippine Army is in full swing. We asked Congress to increase our forces by creating additional infantry battalions and CAFGUs in 2008. The bulk of the secured handheld and manpack radios with digital encryption will be arriving next year – making our combat units fully geared to improve their fighting capabilities. But do we have the combat support that could let them really win?

The field artillery support owned by the different infantry divisions have reorganized lately by forming into one Army Artillery Regiment (AAR) in order for them to shift artillery pieces and personnel where they are really needed. Even the engineering support is now being conceptualized into a National Development Command. With regards to the signal support, there should be a plan to prepare the Signal Group for the sudden surge of modern technologies that the Army is getting next year?

The Harris manpack radios are equipped with Global Positioning System (GPS). An ASR would be deemed necessary to assist field commanders in operating and using it. These radios will be the standard for data communication in the Army. Divisions will no longer have their own unique system using any of these: a Lontocom, Nice-Link, Dovcom or Modemless Datacom. If only an ASR existed earlier, standardization on data communication could have been attained without leaving Signal Battalions at different divisions to plan and acquire their own system, including other CEIS matters. In regards with the repair of these Harris radios, an ASR should assume the cudgel in putting up an AFP Repair Center that would service not only the Army but also the other major service units. The Center would also serve as a laboratory and training school.

Another item in the CUP is the acquisition of Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence and Geographic Information System (C4I/GIS). I know that G3 is the proponent and OPR for this but do they have enough technical expertise? As a backgrounder, a Geographic Information System (GIS) is a system for capturing, storing, analyzing and managing data and associated attributes which are spatially referenced to the Earth. It is a tool that allows users to create interactive queries/searches, analyze the spatial information, edit data, maps, and present the results of all these operations. For example, various enemy movements can be plotted in the map. Letting commanders anticipate the locations the enemy would appear next. Perhaps, we should store the population census of affected barangays. Appearances of new names/faces at a barangay can trigger investigations. With this concept, shifting of forces to a new area would not let the unit start from scratch. The information gained by the previous unit can be handed to their replacements – a form of Knowledge Management. I believe there would be a need for an ASR to network and man the computer terminals to share the valuable information gathered by friendly troops.

Still on the CUP, the Army Mobile Community Radio System (AMCRS) of G7 will be deployed to the rural areas. Technical support from an ASR would again be very much needed in this project. CMOG can just concentrate on the delivery of radio programs and let the ASR operate the AMCRS. Moreover, G4 has turned over to G6 the commodity management of the Army Night Fighting Systems such as the Night Vision Goggles (NVG). An ASB would be prepared to repair NVGs, to include handheld Geographical Positioning Systems (GPS) gadgets, which are also now classified as CEIS items.

The Philippine Army has been paying Bayantel about P1.2 million every month since 1995. The company is our VSAT service provider for our six (6) voice lines in each of the nine (9) infantry divisions (10ID not included). There were no improvements made by them ever despite of the quantum leap occurrence on ICT. Bayantel under its new management promised to improve our telephone facilities with no additional cost and to keep in step with emerging technologies, to include, application of Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP). In this Voice and Data Convergence Project, there will now be eight (8) voice lines and an additional of a 512kbps bandwidth data line for each of the ten (10) infantry divisions – more than enough bandwidth for the Personnel Information Systems (PIS), a tool for G1 on human resource management. The project is expected to be completed by next year. An ASR should now be planning and setting up expectations. With this project, AMIC and SGPA would eventually converge under one roof – under an ASR. AMIC which is a Service Support Unit would move and be a part of Combat Support. In this setup, AMIC can now concentrate on information system development and not be burdened with the problem on cabling. Another unit under ASR would be given the task of intranet/internet connectivity. This would be the same unit tasked on laying out Telephone Cable Facilities (CAFAC).

Then, we are posed with the possibility of Wireless Networking. Let an ASR put a WIFI hotspot at the new APMC building where there is no need for wires and cables.

Upon establishing our voice and data communication backbone, the Satellite Internet found at the different divisions would be transferred to Infantry Brigades that do not have Internet Service Providers (ISP) in the area. As of the recent survey, most units down to the battalions, even some companies, have already internet connections. These may be through DSL, landlines using modems, cellphones (GPRS/EDGE), WeRoam, Globe Visibility, SmartBro, etc. An ASR should supervise and orchestrate the entire interconnectivity of units ready to be part of a net-centric organization. AMIC under ASR would be preparing its facilities and be ready for Virtual Personal Networking (VPN), wherein authorized users that have internet connection could log-in the PANET – similar to the US Army’s Knowledge On-Line (AKO). Here, we can make use of the Email System for sending encrypted documents and do away with facsimiles (FAX) which is the most unsecured way of document transmission. Secured information sharing would be “near real time” – attaining information dominance at all times! Thus, we would be having a well-informed troop.

An ASR should be establishing a Wargame Center for students of TRADOC and battalions that are undergoing retraining. Another teaching tool is to set up a video teleconferencing using video streaming technology. TRADOC can have a studio at Fort Bonifacio where busy personalities in Manila could teach students at O’Donnell remotely.

There are two (2) doctrines that the ASR should be advocating. These are Network-Centric Warfare and Information Operations. Both are about information superiority! Network-Centric Warfare (NCW) is “a new military doctrine that seeks to translate an information advantage, enabled by information technology, into a competitive combat unit through the networking of well informed geographically dispersed forces. Thus, a networked force improves information sharing; information sharing enhances the quality of information and shared situational awareness; shared situational awareness enables collaboration and self-synchronization, and enhances sustainability and speed of command; and these, in turn, dramatically increase mission effectiveness” (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network-centric_warfare). The US Army Field Manual 100-6 describes Information Operation (IO) as “continuous military operations (it may be in peace or in war) within the military information environment that enable, enhance, and protect the commander’s decision cycle and mission execution to achieve an information advantage across the full range of military operations. Information operations include interacting with the Global Information Environment and exploiting or denying an adversary’s information and decision systems”.

The technologies and doctrines mentioned here are only the few solutions that an ASR could offer. There are more other things it would be capable to do that a Signal Group could never perform due to the present definition of its mission and existing organizational structure.

It is, therefore, now very timely for the Signal Group to raise the bar and evolve into a Signal Regiment. The process will not entail additional personnel or extra cost. It would only necessitate restructuring and redefining its missions. At present, the Signal Group is only concerned about Information Technology. Its present mission tells them “to provide Communications Electronics Service for the Command and Control of the Philippine Army”. The only things that they do are to install public address systems (PAS), telephone lines, extenders, repeaters, and repair radios. The Army needs a Signal Regiment that will assume an active role on information dissemination. An ASR that is concerned more about Information Management. Thus, the mission of the ASR should instead tell them “to provide architecture, governance, management, strategy, C4-IT acquisition oversight and operational capabilities to enable a net-centric information dominance for the Philippine Army” (copied from US Army).

A committee on the creation of an ASR, with required sponsorship from G5, is in the process of conceptualizing the organizational structures of an Army Signal Regiment that would adapt to the envisioned national environment and regional battlefields of Area Commands. Transforming the Signal Group into a Signal Regiment would leverage the exponential growth in digital information and information systems technologies to successfully execute future missions. Central to this restructuring are the combat units – mainly, the Infantry Divisions. The Signal Battalions would be still under the operational control of the divisions but manning, equipage and training would be the responsibility of the Signal Regiment. This is how we should structure our entire combat support arm to face unprecedented challenges in the future. A mother unit not the division should plan and program for the career of its personnel, non-operational activities and expenses; and not let them fight it out with the other units under the division they belong. This study discusses the role of Signal Regiment as a strategic planner and integrator of Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence and Geographic Information System (C4I/GIS) in the Army. It concludes that establishment of the Signal Brigade for all matters of C4I/GIS integration is essential to leveraging information age technologies for the combat units and providing the necessary strategic signal leadership to achieve information superiority in the Philippine Army.

In the final analysis, the existence of an ASR would let the Campaign Plan “Bantay Laya II” easily achieves its objectives. Military leaders can plan, think, act and decide fast on matters that can spell out victory because it is always better to decide basing ones options from data rather than by gut-feel. Hence, the creation of a Signal Regiment would give the Army a combat support unit that can really intensify ISO.

Today, Signal officers are multi-talented, skilled and educated not only in the installation, operation and maintenance of traditional communications systems, but also proficient in tactical operations, intelligence and information systems technologies – including data network engineering and computer network and system design. These are the people that would be running the Signal Regiment and our future Cyber Warriors . . .

PLEASE SUPPORT YOUR SIGNAL CORPS!

“Battles are won by combat units – but not without the SIGNAL CORPS.”